A resilient economy threatens to run hot again
The economy experienced a soft landing at end-2024 and shows some early signs of re-acceleration. The labour market is sending mixed signals: unemployment and job creation data suggest the loosening trend could be ending, but new employment is concentrated in a handful of industries (education, healthcare, government, hospitality). Inflation is close to target but appears to be bottoming out, while corporate bankruptcies have risen to their pre-Covid levels. The Fed is expected to deliver one or two more cuts in 2025, but stands ready to pause as inflation risks are tilted to the upside. Unemployment will continue in the 4-4.5% range, somewhat under full employment. However, thanks to the technological investments and the labour reallocation experienced in the last few years, productivity growth has been remarkable and will continue to support solid (albeit moderating) wage growth. Persistently strong consumption (70% of GDP) suggests that demand is being increasingly driven by better-off households and that more slack would be needed to provoke a proper downturn. Investment growth will be modest, given the transmission lags of the Fed’s monetary easing. The risk of reflation and expectations of growing fiscal deficits are putting upward pressure on treasury yields, and consequently on broader financial conditions. In residential investment, this is discouraging both borrowers and sellers as homeowners are reluctant to move and forgo the better conditions on existing mortgages. As for capex, growth in intellectual property spending will remain robust (software and R&D), while prospects are more uncertain more capital-intensive spending (equipment and non-residential construction). Public disbursements (CHIPS, IRA and Infrastructure law) will provide some support to the project pipeline despite bureaucratic rigidities. The deepening of the goods deficit will further outweigh the rising surplus in services, yielding a negative net exports contribution.
At the time of writing, the extent to which the Trump administration will deliver on campaign policy pledges is unclear, bringing significant uncertainty to the outlook (which have not been priced into our forecasts above). Tariffs and deportations, if large enough, would harm industries reliant on imported goods (manufacturing and retail) and undocumented labour (construction, agriculture, accommodation and food services), thus nudging the economy toward stagflation (less growth and more inflation). Furthermore, exporting industries will be exposed to retaliatory tariffs, as has happened in the past with agricultural products. Deregulatory policies, if deep enough, would provide some supply-side relief. Tax measures will only intervene as of 2026, after the expected extension and expansion of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). The net effect of these policies will more likely than not be inflationary; their size and timing will determine the extent.
US dollar dominance allows fiscal largesse, external deficits will persist
Were it not for the attractiveness of US government bonds as the world’s benchmark reserve asset, the fiscal trajectory would be cause for immediate concern. Due to a combination of higher interest rates and persistently high primary deficits (even in a booming economy), interest expenditure has ballooned from a pre-pandemic average of 1.5% of GDP to 3% in 2024, and is expected to rise further as growth normalises but rates stay high. The largest items of spending (social security, health and defence) will continue to grow amid population ageing, rising medical costs and the need to modernise and maintain military capabilities. The push for improving government cost-efficiency should be comparatively small, with the largest potential targets for spending being politically sensitive (spending on veterans, opioid crisis, housing assistance), while cuts to civil service headcount can only go so far. TCJA extension will preserve important reductions to income taxes, and will be expanded by exempting overtime, tips and social security benefits, as well as a further reduction of the corporate tax rate to 15% from the current 21%. Tariff revenue will offset some of the foregone income, but only partially. On the net, new policies are expected to add 1-1.5% of GDP to the deficit each year if implemented as campaigned. Sovereign distress does not seem imminent, but will be a growing tail risk.
We expect a noticeable current account deficit to persist which will be easily financed. First, the good health of the consumer will yield persistent demand for imports, but on the other hand, investment will continue flowing into the economy, while the aforementioned additional deficit spending will create financing requirements. Tariffs could create a reduction of overall imports in the very short run, but trade partner diversification should progressively offset that effect, as well as the dollar's upside bias (especially if the Fed has to maintain rates at a higher level).
“America first” foreign policy, risks to Fed independence
Donald Trump and the Republican party secured a decisive victory in the November 2024 elections, winning the presidency by a comfortable margin in the electoral college (312/538 votes) and in both houses of Congress (220/435 House seats, 53/100 Senate seats). Furthermore, six of the nine judges serving on the US Supreme Court are Republican appointees (three of whom by Trump). The incoming administration will therefore feel emboldened (at least until the 2026 mid-term elections) to enact an agenda based on economic nationalism abroad and relatively market-friendly policies at home. China will be the main target of protectionist policies and security concerns, leading to continued trade decoupling and lingering geopolitical tensions. However, all traditional trading partners and diplomatic allies will face rising pressure and uncertainty as the Trump team seeks to reshape relations on a bilateral basis to the advantage of the US. Free-trade agreements like the USMCA will not shield countries from tariffs, as shown by threats directed at Canada and Mexico. It will, however, be possible for countries to negotiate carve-outs if they are able to meet US terms. The US security umbrella will, in general, be less reliable except where Israel support and China deterrence/containment are concerned. For Ukraine, a fast-tracked resolution will be sought and so more flexible terms will be offered to Russia. We expect that NATO membership will be preserved, but US reluctance to fully enforce security guarantees is plausible, thereby creating incentives for stronger self-reliance.
Regulation roll-back will be a cornerstone of the domestic agenda, targeting environmental restrictions, corporate reporting standards, permits for construction and O&G exploration, banking and crypto regulations. Though some clean energy subsides might be scrapped, most of the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS act policies should be continued. On tariffs and deportations, we expect execution to be slower and milder than what campaign pledges would suggest, but economically significant nonetheless. If the net effect of these policies is stagflationary enough, the incentives to clash with the Fed will be twofold. First, the Fed will want higher rates to fight inflation, while the executive will prefer lower rates to support nominal growth. Second, inflation and high rates are unpopular, and the public may be persuaded that the Fed can be blamed for both. The President cannot remove the Fed Chair, but he does hold significant sway over his base, and has a penchant for targeted attacks on individuals and organisations. Precedent like the 1979 “tractorcade” - where hundreds of cash-strapped farmers drove tractors to Washington D.C. to protest Chair Volcker’s rate hikes - shows that the Fed can be made into a target of public discontent.