Slowdown in activity, hit by political uncertainty
While the economy showed resilience in 2024, the trend was mainly due to public spending and the continued recovery of exports (aerospace, pharmaceuticals) against a backdrop of sluggish domestic demand. Activity will slow in 2025 as it did in the last quarter of 2024, being heavily penalised by political and, consequently, economic uncertainty. Domestic demand will remain sluggish at best. As in 2024, households could see slight gains in purchasing power, with wages outpacing inflation. However, uncertainty will continue to encourage precautionary saving, which is forecast to remain at historic levels, thereby preventing a significant rebound in consumption.
Political and fiscal uncertainty, against a backdrop of necessary budgetary adjustments, will also have an impact on corporate behaviour. Companies are likely to adopt a wait-and-see attitude to investment and hiring, despite the fall in interest rates. In a context of durably limited demand and continued repayment of government PGE loans, businesses will continue to face a difficult environment. Insolvencies are set to remain high, having passed the 64,000 mark in 2024, which is almost 30% more than before the pandemic. While the absence of a lasting majority makes it unlikely that significant budgetary measures – and ultimately spending cuts – will be passed, public spending should no longer be a driving force in 2025. Sluggish domestic demand will limit imports. However, foreign trade is unlikely to take up the slack to support activity due to a persistently unfavourable economic climate in Germany and likely trade tensions with China and the US.
Public finances still very much in the red
After the slippage of 2024, the budget deficit is likely to remain very wide in 2025. While the possibility of approving a 2025 budget is uncertain, the absence of a solid majority should prevent any significant spending cuts or tax increases. In the absence of a 2025 budget, the 2024 budget will be extended. At the same time, the interest burden will continue to grow in the wake of financing rates, which are currently among the highest of the major eurozone economies. Public debt will continue to balloon and its sustainability will be one of the main challenges facing the French economy amid an unfavourable context of political instability.
After narrowing in 2024, thanks to lower energy prices and, more generally, a decrease in imports, the current account deficit will remain stable in 2025. Gas prices could be higher due to lower storage levels at the start of the year, but oil prices are expected to fall provided that geopolitical conflicts do not escalate. The surplus on the services balance (1.6% of GDP) will not be enough to offset the deficit on the goods balance (-2.2% of GDP). The current account deficit is financed by debt issues and listed shares purchased by non-residents. At the end of June 2024, non-residents held more than half of the securities issued by general government bodies (53%), non-financial companies (58%) and French banks (70%).
Political instability due to a more fragmented-than-ever National Assembly
In power since 2017, President Emmanuel Macron, head of the centre-liberal Renaissance party, was re-elected for a second term in April 2022. Although he again beat Marine Le Pen of the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) in the second round, this time the score was closer (58.5%-41.5%, compared with 66%-34% in 2017). In the legislative elections that followed two months later, his party won a mere 170 of the 577 seats in the National Assembly. As its alliance with two other centre-right parties only enabled it to win 250 seats in total and, lacking a majority, the government was forced to pass budgets and reforms without a vote in the National Assembly, exposing itself to a possible vote of no confidence. In June 2024, following the RN's landslide victory in the European elections, President Macron decided to dissolve the National Assembly. The ensuing legislative elections resulted in a National Assembly that was more fragmented than ever, being divided into three blocs and making an absolute majority impossible. The left-wing alliance Nouveau Front populaire (NFP) secured 192 seats (including 72 for the far-left party La France insoumise - LFI), the centrist coalition Ensemble 164 and the RN 143. Faced with the impossibility of securing a majority and after two months of consultations, President Macron appointed Michel Barnier of the right-wing Les Républicains party (LR, 53 seats) as Prime Minister. All the members of the NFP immediately pledged to cast a vote of no confidence against him, making the survival of Michel Barnier's minority government, composed of Ensemble and LR ministers, solely dependent on support from the RN. The Barnier government finally fell at the beginning of December, following a vote of no confidence vote – the first since 1962 – in retaliation for the 2025 budget bill. On 13 December 2024, President Macron appointed the centrist François Bayrou as Prime Minister.
Despite the presence of former Socialists who were ministers under François Hollande (2012-2017), François Bayrou's government does not include any members of the NFP parties. Consequently, although, unlike LFI MPs, the Socialists, Ecologists and Communists did not immediately come out in favour of a no confidence motion against the incoming government, such a move can in no way be ruled out. In this context, approval of a 2025 budget is possible – albeit without a major reduction in the deficit due to the lack of a majority to pass major measures – but far from guaranteed.
Faced with this unprecedented fragmentation, which makes it impossible to achieve a lasting majority, the scenario of a dissolution of the National Assembly and the calling of new legislative elections seems unavoidable in the long term. The exact timing of such a decision, which cannot take place until at least July 2025, is unclear and will probably depend on the survival of the Bayrou government. Given the fragmented and polarised political landscape, however, it is highly unlikely that a majority will emerge if new legislative elections are called. The risk of political instability is therefore set to remain particularly high in the short term.